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1983-84 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CIVIL LIBERTIES
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER*
ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON**
I. SUITS BROUGHT UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
During its 1983-1984 term, the Seventh Circuit decided a number of
interesting cases in the area of freedom of speech, freedom of association,
and freedom of religion.
A. Access to Public Forums for the Expression of
First Amendment Rights
In National Anti-Drug Coalition, Inc. v. Bolger,1 a non-profit corpo-
ration seeking to sell literature and solicit public contributions and mem-
berships outside the post office, challenged a Postal Service regulation
prohibiting all such solicitation on postal premises. The regulation was
interpreted to include ingress and egress sidewalks located on United
States Postal Service property. The court had little difficulty concluding
that the solicitation of contributions and sale of literature are expressions
of speech protected by the First Amendment. 2 However, it also recog-
nized that the First Amendment does not grant carte blanche power to
those wishing to engage in free expression.
Recent Supreme Court cases have focused on the nature of the pub-
lic property in deciding the extent to which government regulation is
permissible. As discussed in last year's Survey, 3 the Supreme Court in
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educator's Association4 deline-
ated three categories of public property: (1) traditional public forums
such as streets and parks, which by tradition have been used for expres-
sive purposes; (2) "limited" public forums, "which the state has opened
for use by the public as a place for expressive activity"; and (3) non-
public forums, public property which is not by tradition a forum for pub-
lic communication. As to the latter, the Supreme Court has held that
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; J.D., Notre Dame Law School.
** Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; J.D., Valparaiso University School
of Law.
1. 737 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 720.
3. Bodensteiner & Levinson, Current Developments in Civil Liberties, 60 CHI-KENT. L. REV.
455, 460-64 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as "Survey"].
4. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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government can reserve such forums for their intended purposes and,
provided the regulation is reasonable and does not suppress a particular
viewpoint, it will be upheld. In the traditional or limited public forums,
however, the state may only enforce regulations which are content neu-
tral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
which leave open ample alternative channels of communication.5
The difficult question raised by Bolger is how to categorize the in-
gress/egress sidewalks that connect the municipal sidewalks to the post
office buildings. If such constitute a traditional public forum, it will be
much more difficult to justify a flat ban on communication. A recent
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Grace, 6 holds that the Supreme
Court grounds, as defined to include the exterior premises and the mu-
nicipal sidewalks, cannot be foreclosed as a forum for First Amendment
purposes. Such an absolute prohibition on expressive activities can be
upheld only if narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government
interest. 7 Because the facts in Bolger indicate that postal property was
open for the free distribution of literature and other First Amendment
activity, it is at least arguable that the property here constituted a "lim-
ited" public forum under the Perry analysis. The Seventh Circuit, how-
ever, refused to decide the issue because of a lack of evidence regarding
the physical characteristics of the ingress/egress sidewalks and other mu-
nicipal sidewalks-evidence it deemed critical in determining whether
the postal service property indeed was "open" to the public for expres-
sive activity.8 Instead it held that, even as a public forum, the regulation
could be sustained as a reasonable time, manner, place restriction, be-
cause it was content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest, and it left open ample alternative channels of
communication.
The court justified its holding by noting that prior to 1978 postal
property was available for expressive activities, and this had resulted in
much disturbance in the performance of postal duties. The history be-
hind the regulation indicates that the postal service deemed the rule nec-
essary to prevent disruption and hindrances to the conduct of postal
business. 9 The court further held that there was a need for a flat ban in
all postal offices because of the importance of adopting uniform regula-
5. Id. at 45.
6. 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983).
7. Id. at 1707.
8. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 737 F.2d at 722-23.
9. Id. at 726.
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tions.' 0 Finally, the court reasoned that the rule provided more than
ample alternative channels for free expression in that it permitted solici-
tation of public contributions on the municipal sidewalks surrounding
postal property, as well as other types of communication, i.e., free distri-
bution of literature on postal property.
The Seventh Circuit's analysis is disturbing because of its failure to
distinguish between the interior postal property and the exterior side-
walks. As to the former, the trend in recent years has been to character-
ize most government-owned property as a non-public forum justifying
even a flat ban on speech. 1 Aside from the decision in Heffron v. Inter-
national Society for Krishna Consciousness,'2 in which state fair grounds
were held to be a limited public forum, the Supreme Court has generally
taken the position that government-owned property may be reserved for
its intended purposes without impermissibly infringing on free speech
rights. ' 3 The evidence surrounding passage of the 1978 postal regulation
indicates that the use of postal lobby space for expressive activity had
been "highly unsatisfactory" in that it disturbed postal employees in
their performance of their duties, and it impeded the public in transact-
ing postal business.' 4 Thus the court really did not even have to use the
more stringent time, manner, place analysis in upholding the exclusion of
interior postal service property. As a non-public forum, it would have
sufficed that the state had a reasonable interest and that the provision
was viewpoint neutral.
The problem, however, is that the regulation was interpreted to in-
clude ingress and egress sidewalks, although there was no evidence indi-
cating that solicitation on such sidewalks created a disturbance. If the
sidewalks had been categorized as a public forum, the Supreme Court's
analysis in United States v. Grace, indicates that the flat ban could not be
upheld. Once a forum is designated as public, flat bans are presump-
tively impermissible and will not be upheld as reasonable time, manner,
place restrictions. Instead, regulations must be narrowly drawn, i.e., no
10. Id. at 727.
11. In Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, the Court held that public school mail facilities constitute a non-
public forum. Similarly, in U.S. Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns., 453 U.S. 114 (1981), the
Court held that a letter box was a non-public forum; in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), it held
that a military base was a non-public forum; and in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974), it held that advertising space on public transportation was a non-public forum. Most re-
cently, in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984), it upheld a flat
ban on posting signs on public property, reasoning in part that such property constituted a non-
public forum.
12. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
13. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2134; U.S. Postal Service
v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns., 453 U.S. at 131 n.7.
14. Nat'l Anti-Drug Coalition, 737 F.2d at 725.
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more restrictive of speech than is absolutely necessary to serve a compel-
ling government interest.' 5 Although the Supreme Court in the recent
decision of Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent1 6 did
uphold a flat ban on the use of public property, it recognized that as a flat
ban, a more stringent analysis was required. 17 Here, the post office failed
to demonstrate that the problems of using ingress/egress sidewalks were
of a sufficient magnitude to justify a total ban on all solicitation. Since
potential disruption is governed by the specific layout of different post
offices, a general ban is not narrowly drawn to accomplish the govern-
ment's interest. Although conceding that the ban in the long run may be
upheld, the dissenting judge persuasively argued that summary judgment
was not appropriate in light of the limited record.' 8
B. Political Patronage and Public Contracts
A second case in which the Seventh Circuit rejected a First Amend-
ment claim was LaFalce v. Houston,19 holding that the First Amendment
does not forbid a city from using political criteria in awarding public
contracts. The Seventh Circuit refused to extend earlier Supreme Court
holdings that the discharge of a non-policymaking public employee solely
because of his political beliefs violates the First Amendment. 20 In this
case, plaintiff argued that although he was the lowest bidder on a city
contract, the contract was awarded to another business which was a
political supporter of the mayor. In its rulings, the Supreme Court did
not comment on whether its decisions applied to patronage hirings as
well as patronage dismissals; however, most lower courts have extended
15. Grace, 103 S. Ct. at 1707.
16. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
17. Indeed, in that case the Court used the stricter analysis even though it proceeded to hold
that it was dealing with speech in a non-public forum. Note, however, that Vincent, as well as this
case, indicates a growing indifference to the free speech rights of those too poor to afford more
expensive methods of communication. In Vincent, the Supreme Court upheld a flat ban on posting
signs on public property even though such was an extremely effective and inexpensive method of
communication. Similarly, in this case the court rejected the equal protection argument that this
prohibition interferred with the speech of organizations which could not afford to distribute free
literature. Nat'l Anti-Drug Coalition, 737 F.2d at 728. The same indifference to communication by
those with limited resources is reflected in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S.
Ct. 3065 (1984), upholding government's right to prohibit "overnight sleeping" as part of a demon-
stration to draw attention to the plight of the homeless. The Court's reluctance to closely scrutinize
the regulation is clearly reflected in its statement that the judiciary is not endowed "with the compe-
tence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be
attained." Id. at 3072. Despite the terminology used regarding "necessary" or "narrowly drawn"
means, the trend in recent years has been to give an unwarranted amount of deference to govern-
ment's asserted need to regulate.
18. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 737 F.2d at 729 (Wood, J., dissenting).
19. 712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 712 (1984).
20. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
CIVIL LIBERTIES
First Amendment protection to political hirings. 2 1 Without focusing on
this distinction, the Seventh Circuit more generally concluded that polit-
ical patronage protection does not extend to government contractors,
and thus the suit was properly dismissed.
The court focused on both the magnitude of the loss, as well as the
cost to government. It noted that unlike government employees, most
government contractors also have private customers, and thus are less
dependent and less chilled in their speech rights than an employee would
be. Further, the court reasoned that since many firms are "political
hermaphrodites," supporting both major parties, it is unlikely that even a
constitutional rule against allowing politics to influence the contracting
process would have much of an impact on these entities. 22 On the other
hand, the court stressed the potentially large cost to the operation of our
system of government where patronage has been such a vital force in
American politics. Thus, it was "reluctant to tamper with political insti-
tutions when the competing First Amendment interests are as attenuated
as they appear to be here."
23
The court refused to extend the standard utilized by the Supreme
Court in the government employee patronage cases-namely compelling
interest and least restrictive means. 24 Instead it used a general balancing
approach based on a perceived difference in the degree of coercion im-
posed on contractors versus employees. However, as one authority has
argued, "available contracts are not necessarily more plentiful to a con-
tractor than are jobs to an individual, especially for small or specialized
contractors. ' 25 Because there is at least the potential that the denial of
contracts may result in economic ruin for the contractor, it is unrealistic
to minimize the burden imposed by the political patronage system in this
context. The government interests cited by the court are no different
than those deemed to be insufficient in the case of government employ-
ees. The effect of denying patronage on the political system, as well as
the cost of having to defend such litigation, were considered, but deemed
insufficient in the patronage employment cases. Although the burden of
having to litigate a new category of patronage cases cannot be mini-
21. See cases cited in Comment, Political Patronage in Public Contracting, 51 U. CHI. L. REv.
518, 527-27, n.58 (1984).
22. LaFalce, 712 F.2d at 294.
23. Id.
24. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. at 362-63.
25. Comment, supra note 21, at 533. The author notes that the coercion may even be greater in
that having lost the power to coerce support through patronage employment practices, emphasis will
instead be focused on patronage contracting. By contracting out government services now per-
formed by employees, the holdings in Elrod and Branti could be avoided.
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mized, it should be noted that only where political affiliation is a substan-
tial motivating factor in contracting decisions will the government entity
be subjected to litigation. 26 The court's affirmance of the dismissal of the
action denies plaintiffs the opportunity to prove that in their situation,
the patronage employment cases should control.
27
C. Government Regulation of Religious Entities
Although the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment guarantee freedom of religion and non-entanglement be-
tween church and state, in general, the Supreme Court has upheld appli-
cation of various government regulations, such as zoning, land use,
building and fire codes, and labor laws to religious entities. 28 Thus, reli-
gious organizations have been required to comply with the minimum
wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 and in
the recent decision of United States v. Lee, it was held that the free exer-
cise clause does not relieve Amish taxpayers from their obligation to pay
social security taxes. 30 On the other hand, in NL.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago,31 the Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relation
Board's jurisdiction does not extend to lay faculty employed by parochial
schools. The Court, however, avoided the difficult religious questions
that would be posed by applying the National Labor Relations Act
(N.L.R.A.) to such pervasively religious institutions. It invoked instead
a somewhat questionable rule of statutory interpretation, requiring af-
firmative Congressional intent to include parochial schools under the
N.L.R.A. 32 Since it found no clear expression of Congressional intent to
bring teachers in church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the
Board, it declined to construe the Act in a manner which would force it
26. See discussion of pleading and proof problems in last year's Survey, supra note 3, at 456-60.
27. The same conclusion was reached in two Eighth Circuit decisions, which are discussed and
analyzed in Comment, supra note 21, at 553-58.
28. See Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Orga-
nizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 398-401 (1984).
29. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
1013 (1954).
30. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Note this term the Seventh Circuit in Templeton v. C.I.R., 719 F.2d
1408 (7th Cir. 1983) similarly rejected the claims of taxpayers who alleged exemption from the self-
employment income tax. The court held that the taxpayers failed to furnish evidence establishing
that they met the exemption for religious sects who are conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the
benefits of private or public insurance, and thus they lacked standing to challenge the provisions as
violative of their free exercise rights. In concurrence, Judge Eschbach felt that although the Tem-
pletons had standing to raise the free exercise issues, the Supreme Court decision in Lee makes it
clear that the free exercise clause does not relieve taxpayers such as the Templetons of their obliga-
tion to pay social security taxes. Id. at 1414.
31. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
32. Id. at 502.
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to resolve difficult First Amendment religious freedom questions. 33
The Seventh Circuit in St. Elizabeth Hospital v. N.L.R.B. 34 was
faced with the question of whether the N.L.R.A. applied to religiously
affiliated hospitals, requiring such hospitals to collectively bargain with a
union. The court rejected the hospital's argument that the N.L.R.B.'s
assertion of jurisdiction would "inevitably create an impermissible risk of
government entanglement with the religious functioning of the hospi-
tal."' 35 Instead it joined the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in holding
that since a hospital's primary activity is secular, assertion of N.L.R.B.
jurisdiction does not violate the institutions's first amendment rights.
36
The court distinguished N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, noting
that parochial schools are permeated with substantial religious activity,
teachers in such schools have a critical role in fulfilling the school's reli-
gious mission, and the employment relationships in this environment dif-
fer from those in non-religious schools.
37
Although the Catholic Bishop case was based on the Court's inter-
pretation of Congressional intent, here this factor works against the hos-
pital. As the Seventh Circuit notes, when Congress in 1974 amended the
N.L.R.A. to include non-profit hospitals, it specifically rejected an
amendment which would have excluded hospitals operated by religious
organizations. 38 Having clearly intended to include religious hospitals,
the question, therefore, is only whether Congress can constitutionally do
so. Because hospital employees are engaged primarily in medical care, it
is difficult to see how application of the N.L.R.A. would interfere with
the religious mission of the institution. Generally, in assessing religious
liberty cases, the court looks to the religious character of the organiza-
tion, the intensity of church-state entanglements, and the resulting rela-
tionship between the religious body and government. 39 Although there is
little likelihood that nurses or service and maintenance personnel are en-
gaged in core religious activities, there appears to be no reason to deny
them the collective bargaining protection afforded by the Act. Unlike a
parochial school, where religious and non-religious functions are difficult
to segregate, and thus excessive entanglement cannot be avoided, the
''pervasively" secular character of a hospital justifies a different
conclusion.
33. Id. at 507.
34. 715 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1983).
35. Id. at 1195.
36. Id. at 1196-97.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1197.
39. See Esbeck, supra note 28, and text accompanying notes 208-09.
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II. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES
The Seventh Circuit decided numerous cases involving challenges to
government action based on the due process and equal protection
clauses. In general, the decisions reflect an exceedingly deferential ap-
proach to government's right to regulate and a reluctance to find federal
constitutional violations.
A. Protecting Property and Liberty Interests Through the
Due Process Clause
The starting point for analysis in any due process challenge is deter-
mining whether plaintiffs have been deprived of any cognizable "prop-
erty" or "liberty" interest. As explained in the case of Altman v. Hurst,
4
0
a property interest arises only if there are "such rules or mutually explicit
understandings that support [a] claim of entitlement to the benefit."' 4' As
to identification of a liberty interest, a separate standard has evolved,
which was discussed in a number of cases.
In Lawson v. Sheriff of Tippecanoe County, Indiana,42 the court held
that although the plaintiff did not have a property interest in her job as
police radio dispatcher, if she lost her job and the government simultane-
ously impugned her moral character through public derogatory state-
ments, a liberty interest would be created.4 3 Judge Posner explains that
the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment includes liberty to
follow a trade, profession or calling. If a person is excluded from his
calling by both loss of job and the making of statements which would
preclude future employment, due process attaches. 44 In this case, the
district court denied relief because at the time of the firing, it was alleged
that plaintiff was offered alternative employment. Judge Posner notes,
however, that an employer cannot avoid liability by offering an employee
a job far beneath the one she occupied, because such would still consti-
tute effective exclusion from one's trade or calling.45 The case was there-
fore remanded to determine whether the job offered was degradingly
inferior to the job of police radio dispatcher, such that the offer would
not negate the deprivation of liberty.
It should be stressed that it is the coupling of a firing together with a
public announcement which impugns an employee's moral character that
40. 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 385 (1984).
41. Id. at 1242, quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
42. 725 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1984).
43. Id. at 1138.
44. Id. at 1139.
45. Id.
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gives rise to a liberty interest. Thus in the subsequent decision of Hershi-
now v. Bonamarte46 the court held that where plaintiff police officer re-
ceived a three-day suspension without pay, even if such a suspension on
grounds of unprofessional conduct may have served as a "black mark"
impeding the officer's future job advancement, he was not fired, and,
therefore, the deprivation does not rise to a constitutional level.47 Judge
Posner cautioned that if every reprimand which became part of a public
employee's file would be a potential basis for a Section 1983 case, "the
federal courts would become the grievance machinery for public-sector
employees."
'48
The most interesting Seventh Circuit decision discussing the mean-
ing of "liberty" is Jackson v. City of Joliet.49 In this case plaintiffs alleged
that their decedents were deprived of life and liberty as a result of the
actions of various government officials. The decedents were involved in a
traffic accident in which their automobile burst into flames. The Joliet
police officer who arrived at the scene failed to save anyone who might
have been trapped in the car and also prevented other motorists from
doing so by setting up a barricade. Further, when the firemen arrived,
they failed to take any action to rescue the plaintiffs' decedents from the
burning car or to assist them after the fire was out. In addition, the coro-
ner had a rule which prevented the firemen and paramedics from aiding
the decedents. 50 While conceding that the complaint stated good claims
under general tort principles, in that an individual who starts to rescue
someone must complete that rescue in a non-negligent fashion, the court
concluded that the complaint failed to state actionable claims under the
Constitution.
5 '
Judge Posner rejected the argument that the "liberty" clause pro-
tects certain positive liberties, i.e., the right to receive the elementary pro-
46. 735 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1984).
47. Note too the conclusion in Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1243, n.8, that the mayor's
statement to the newspapers that Altman was being disciplined were not so defamatory and stigma-
tizing as to trigger a liberty interest.
48. Hershinow, 735 F.2d at 266. This same reluctance to constitutionalize employee grievances
is reflected in Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir. 1984), holding that an employee's conduct
did not involve a matter of public interest, but rather a private personnel dispute, and thus the
Supreme Court decision in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) controlled. Connick held that a
federal court "is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision
taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior" unless there were unusual
circumstances. Id. at 147.
49. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1325 (1984).
50. Id. at 1202.
51. Id. at 1203.
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tective services that the state routinely provides users of its highways.5 2
Instead, he views the Constitution as a charter of negative liberties con-
cerned with government interference with basic rights. In the absence of
some type of discriminatory deprivation of government services, no fed-
eral claim exists. As to the allegation that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids a state from depriving anyone of his "life" without due process of
law, plaintiff did not claim that defendants tried to harm the occupants
of the car, but simply that they failed to help them-again stating no
claim actionable under the due process clause.5 3 The court distinguished
earlier Seventh Circuit decisions, such as White v. Rochford,54 where the
police arrested a driver and left his child passengers stranded in a driver-
less car. In that situation, it was the police action which put the children
in a situation of peril, and thus liability could be imposed. Here the dece-
dents were in danger prior to the defendants' appearance on the scene.
The Court's refusal to find a cause of action here is based primarily
on two theories. First, it reasons that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment never intended to constitutionalize what is essentially gov-
ernment inaction.5 5 Second, it relies upon basic federalism concerns, i.e.,
that there is no reason for federal judicial intervention where there is no
showing that this type of incompetence "will flourish unchecked by state
law."'5 6 Although both the reluctance to constitutionalize another area
of law based on government inaction as well as the reluctance to allow
federal intervention in state affairs are understandable, the egregious fact
situation presented here, involving reckless indifference to human life
warrants a different outcome. The focus on state remedies reflects the
Supreme Court's analysis in Parratt v. Taylor,57 holding that due process
is not violated when the state negligently deprives a person of his prop-
erty, provided an adequate state post-deprivation tort remedy exists.
Here, however, it is not merely a deprivation of property-rather the
most serious deprivations of life and liberty have occurred. Surely the
court's concern with federalism should have taken a back seat.
58
52. Id. at 1203-04. Judge Posner notes the Supreme Court's refusal to reinterpret the Four-
teenth Amendment to guarantee provision of basic services such as education, poor relief, etc.
53. Id. at 1204.
54. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
55. Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1205.
56. Id.
57. See text accompanying notes 80-86, infra.
58. Several courts have refused to extend Parratt to deprivations of liberty, relying upon the
concurring opinions in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 545 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See,
e.g., Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1984); Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982 (2d
Cir. 1983); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1982); Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708
(9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983). See also Note, Parratt v. Taylor:
Limitations on the Parratt Analysis in Section 1983 Actions, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 1388, 1404
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As to the notion that government inaction does not give rise to a
constitutional claim, although there is some support for this theory in the
lower federal courts,5 9 the Supreme Court has recognized that sometimes
government inaction in face of a duty to act gives rise to a constitutional
claim. For example, deliberate indifference to medical needs states an
actionable Eighth Amendment claim.60 At some point grossly negligent,
egregious government behavior, falling short of "affirmative" action,
should give rise to a due process claim. 61 This is especially true in a case
such as Jackson where government officials took steps which prevented
others from offering assistance to the decedents-thus involving more
than purely government inaction. Some appellate courts have recognized
actionable § 1983 suits under similar circumstances. In Doe v. New York
City Department of Social Services,62 the Second Circuit found a state
hospital liable for the grossly negligent discharge of a patient resulting in
his death, and in Morrison v. Washington County,6 3 the Eleventh Circuit
found violation of the duty to care for an inebriated person who died as a
result of an alcohol-related syndrome while in police custody. The
Supreme Court, as it did in these two decisions, again refused to grant
review in Jackson, thus leaving the lower courts without definitive guide-
lines as to when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a
constitutional violation.
In addition to the narrowing trend in defining what constitutes
property and liberty interests, the decisions of the Seventh Circuit also
reflect a reluctance to protect identified interests through the imposition
of specific procedural safeguards. As Judge Posner recently noted, "The
test of due process in its procedural aspect is not the formality of the
proceedings, but whether the risk of error is kept to a reasonable level in
view of the nature of the issues and the size of the stakes in the proceed-
(1984), suggesting that the traditional hierarchy of constitutional interests, placing life and liberty
above property, justifies this distinction.
59. See, e.g., Dollar v. Haralson County, Ga., 704 F.2d 1540 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (negligent refusal
to build a bridge is not actionable). See also the cases discussed in Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1204-05.
60. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
61. In another Seventh Circuit decision this term, State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d
1140, 1147 (7th Cir. 1983), the court acknowledged that government conduct so egregious that it
"shocks the conscience" does give rise to a due process violation (citing to Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952), where it was held that forcefully administering an emetic to obtain evidence
violates due process). It concludes, however, that defendant's failure to adequately supervise the
deceased, who committed suicide while incarcerated, did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. Id. at 1148. Although suggesting that Parratt may preclude the litigation, in light of
Illinois' wrongful death statute, it rested its ultimate holding on lack of intent to cause the suicide
and the absence of any conduct which could be described as shocking to the conscience. Id.
62. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), after remand, 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 195 (1983).
63. 700 F.2d 678 (llth Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 195 (1983).
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ings." 64 Thus in Lister v. Hoover,65 it was held that due process did not
require the Committee of Appeals at the University of Wisconsin to give
written reasons for its denial of a student's request to be classified as a
state resident for tuition purposes. The majority opinion adopted the
reasoning of the district court judge who applied the traditional Mathews
v. Eldridge66 approach, weighing the private interest affected, the govern-
ment's interest, and the risk of erroneous deprivation together with the
probable value of increased procedures. It found that the property inter-
est at stake-the difference between resident and non-resident student
tuition-was slight, whereas the government's interest in its financial re-
sources and its interest in providing a college education for all Wisconsin
high school graduates was great.67 Further, the burden of requiring a
statement of reasons in light of the large number of appeals filed annually
would be significant. The risk of an erroneous deprivation was minimal
because present procedures provided four opportunities for reclassifica-
tion, each before a different body of decisionmakers. Finally, the subjec-
tive nature of the dispositive issue of student intent convinced the court
that the risk of erroneous decisions was unlikely to be significantly re-
duced by a committee statement of reasons. 68
Only Judge Swygert dissented, accusing the majority of minimizing
the significance of the property interest at stake.69 Requiring payment of
the non-resident rate may delay or foreclose educational opportunities,
whereas Wisconsin's interest in avoiding the administrative burden of
providing a statement of reasons was minimal, especially since the ap-
peals committee was already conducting individualized hearings. Ac-
cording to the dissenting judge, a statement of reasons is a "skeletal level
of process due," assuring that the state's power to reclassify students is
done in accordance with specific statutory criteria.70 Although earlier
Supreme Court decisions have imposed the procedural requirement of a
statement of reasons, 71 more recently, in Hewitt v. Helms, 72 the Court
64. Baer v. City of Wauwatosa, 716 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (7th Cir. 1983), holding that although
the plaintiff was not given a trial when his license to sell guns was taken away, he was provided
notice of a charge against him as well as two hearings at which he testified and cross-examined other
witnesses. These procedures were deemed adequate assurance against mistaken judgment.
65. 706 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1983), previous opinion at 655 F.2d 123.
66. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
67. Lister, 706 F.2d at 803.
68. Id. at 804-05.
69. Id. at 800. (Swygert, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (requiring a statement of reasons regard-
ing revocation of a prisoner's good time credits); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (revoca-
tion of probation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole); Willner v.
Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (bar certification).
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held that none was required when transferring a prisoner to administra-
tive segregation pending investigation. Thus, again, the Seventh Circuit
is simply following guidance provided by the Supreme Court.
The need for a pre-deprivation hearing was the issue in three Sev-
enth Circuit decisions this term. 73 In Simmons v. Drew,7 4 two partici-
pants in a public rent assistance program claimed that the Fourteenth
Amendment entitled them to a hearing before the administrative state
agency could expel them. In both cases, the plaintiffs were readmitted
into the program following a hearing some two months after their expul-
sion. However, the housing authority claimed that it lacked power to
award retroactive rent assistance payments for the excluded period of
time.75 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment against one of the plaintiffs, reasoning that the lack of
authority to award retroactive rent assistance payments made it constitu-
tionally mandatory that a participant be granted a hearing prior to expul-
sion.76 The court acknowledged that only an informal hearing, similar to
the type received after expulsion, was required, and it also suggested that
a post-expulsion hearing might have sufficed if retroactive payments of
rent assistance benefits were made available to the plaintiff.77 This ca-
veat, together with a general lack of analysis in terms of balancing com-
peting interests, suggests that the decision is of limited precedential
value. 78 The court's dicta ignores the irreparable harm-denial of shel-
ter-which occurs regardless of the availability of retroactive rent
payments.
72. 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983).
73. It was also an issue in Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984), upholding a New York law
permitting the detention without a hearing of juveniles where there is a serious risk that the juvenile
may commit a criminal act before his case is adjudicated. The Court reasoned that the statute
provided sufficient post-detention procedures to satisfy due process requirements. Thus, the absence
of a pre-deprivation hearing was not deemed unconstitutional. Compare Loudermill v. Cleveland
Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2384 (1984), holding that public
employees were entitled to an opportunity to present evidence to refute charges against them before
discharge. The availability of a full evidentiary post-discharge hearing "does not suggest that no
other process was due." Id. at 560.
74. 716 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1983).
75. Id. at 1162.
76. Id. at 1164.
77. The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate in the case of one of the
plaintiffs because he had been given a bench trial in state court prior to his eviction, and this pre-
ceded the expulsion. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the local housing authority was not
constitutionally required to afford a second hearing prior to the expulsion. Id. at 1163.
78. Note that in Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981), it was similarly held that due
process only requires that some type of a hearing occur before retroactive benefits arefinally denied.
Id. at 1281. Thus, assuming some method to recoup retroactive benefits was made available, the
majority probably would have had little difficulty upholding the expulsion even without a pre-depri-
vation hearing, regardless of the magnitude of the interim loss.
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The other two decisions alleging due process violations concern
breaches of government employment contracts. It is significant that
neither involved actual termination of employment, but rather violations
of certain terms in the employment contract. This distinction is relevant
in that it invokes the court's general concern with federalizing less signifi-
cant tortious conduct. 79 Both opinions cite Parratt v. Taylor,80 holding
that a claim for negligent interference with loss of property is not action-
able in federal court where the state provides adequate post-deprivation
remedies. Of significance to these cases is the Court's extension of Par-
ratt last term to include intentional deprivations of property, based on its
reasoning that whenever loss occurs as a result of random, unauthorized
official misconduct, the existence of an adequate post-deprivation remedy
satisfies due process. 81 On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Board
of Education of Paris Union School District No. 95 v. Vail,82 summarily
affirmed by an equally divided court a Seventh Circuit ruling that the
intentional termination of an implied contract of employment, without a
hearing, constitutes a violation of the due process clause. The Seventh
Circuit specifically held that Parratt and its progeny applied only where a
pre-deprivation hearing would be meaningless.8 3
The approach reflected in Vail is supported by the Supreme Court's
earlier decision in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,84 holding that "ab-
sent the 'necessity of quick action by the State of the impracticality of
providing any pre-deprivation process', a post-deprivation hearing...
would be constitutionally inadequate." Because the property loss in Lo-
gan occurred as a result of an established state procedure, it remains un-
clear whether the same conclusion would be reached where only official
misconduct is challenged. 85 The basic question is whether Parratt analy-
sis rests on the availability of state tort remedies for official misconduct
79. See discussion of Joliet v. City of Jackson, supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
80. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). A lengthy and detailed analysis of Parratt and its progeny may be
found in last year's Survey, supra note 3, at 480-92.
81. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3203-04 (1984).
82. 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984).
83. Vail v. Board of Educ. of Paris Union School Dist. No. 95, 706 F.2d 1435, 1440-41 (7th Cir.
1983), discussed in last year's Survey, supra note 3, at 489.
84. 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982).
85. The argument is that whenever random state official misconduct, as opposed to an estab-
lished state procedure, has caused the wrong, a pre-deprivation hearing is "impractical." In deter-
mining whether action has been taken pursuant to an "established procedure," it is not necessary to
point to an actual statute. At least one court has acknowledged that "decisions made by officials
with final authority over significant matters" constitute "established procedure" and thus are effec-
tively removed from Parrait consideration. Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 988 (2d
Cir. 1983). See also Vail, 706 F.2d at 1448. Note that this term the Supreme Court is considering
whether the discharge of a public sector employee without a hearing violates due process where the
State provides post-termination procedures. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loundermill, infra note 86.
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as negating all due process challenges, or whether the impracticality of a
pre-deprivation hearing is central to its application.8 6 The former
broader concept appears to prevail in the Seventh Circuit's most recent
encounters with due process challenges.
In Brown v. Brienen, Judge Posner, who wrote a stinging dissent to
the Vail decision last term,87 framed the issue as
whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 displaces the whole of the state law of public
contracts into the federal courts through the characterization of a
breach of such a contract as a deprivation of property without due
86. For an excellent criticism of the Parratt development, see Note, Unauthorized Deprivations
of Property Under Color of Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Due Process Analysis in Parratt,
36 RUTGERS L. REV. 179 (1983-84). Since publication of the last Survey, there have been numerous
federal court decisions applying and expanding the Parratt doctrine. Many of these cases have ig-
nored the "infeasibility" aspect of its analysis and have relied instead on the availability of state
remedies as satisfying due process where only official misconduct is challenged. Compare, e.g.,
Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 562 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
2384 (1984) (distinguishing Parratt as a case where a pre-deprivation hearing is not feasible or practi-
cal); Schultz v. Bangart, 738 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1984) (post-deprivation remedies do not satisfy due
process if pre-deprivation remedies are practicable); Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 328 (1984) (tenured public school principal who resigned under pressure was not
entitled to a "pre-coercion" hearing which was "not feasible"; and the post-deprivation remedy
under state statute, which included a hearing and the availability of reinstatement and monetary
relief, was adequate to satisfy due process); Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1983) (Par-
ratt applies to a liberty deprivation for which a pre-deprivation hearing is impractical, even though it
appeared that Virginia's doctrine of sovereign immunity would have precluded damages. Due pro-
cess only requires the state grant a meaningful time and opportunity for a hearing, and is not vio-
lated by the existence of affirmative defenses); Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1982)
(Parratt applies only where it would have been impractical for the state to have provided any pre-
deprivation process) with Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 34 Cr. L. 2454 (5th Cir. 1984) (the availability of
state post-deprivation remedies precludes a § 1983 action based on the negligent deprivation of a
liberty interest where an incarcerated inmate was injured in a fire set by a drunken inmate); Vicory v.
Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984) (Parratt requires that
plaintiff in a § 1983 damage suit based on deprivation of property, whether intentional or negligent,
must plead and prove that state procedures are inadequate to redress a claimed wrong. Here the
state post-deprivation remedy for replevin or inverse condemnation satisfied due process); Cohen v.
City of Philadelphia, 736 F.2d 81, 86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 434 (1984) (the availability of
state judicial review of a city's civil service commission's decision regarding a discharged police
officer precludes the officer's action under § 1983. The court cites with approval First and Seventh
Circuit holdings that "substantive mistakes by administrative bodies in applying local ordinances do
not create a federal claim so long as correction is available by the state's judiciary." Id. at 86);
Enright v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Directors, 346 N.W.2d 771 (Wisc. S. Ct. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 365 (1984) (the availability of state wrongful death action precludes parents of a school child
whose murder allegedly resulted from negligent supervision from maintaining a § 1983 action
against the school board for deprivation of due process). Note that these latter decisions focus on
language in Parratt suggesting that state action for purposes of § 1983 is not "complete" where only
state official misconduct, instead of a challenge to an actual state law, is alleged and state law pro-
vides a means to make the plaintiff whole. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 542 (quoting with approval now-
Justice Stevens' analysis in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en banc, 545
F.2d 565 (1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). In simple terms, the Court has separated the
action of state officers from the action of the state, contrary to its holdings in Home Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 294 (1913) and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172
(1961). The Court determined in these cases that the fact that conduct of state officials is in violation
of state law does not prevent it from being action of the state or action "under color of state law."
87. Vail, 706 F.2d at 1449 (Posner, J., dissenting).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
process of law, even though most such disputes have nothing to do
with civil rights as ordinarily understood.8 8
Posner expressed his concern that breach of employment contracts suits
have become a burdensome part of the business of federal courts, noting
seven such cases which were handed down by this court in recent
months .89
In Brown, a sheriff breached his agreement to grant compensatory
time off to employees in his department who worked overtime. Because
of the growth in workload and a failure to appropriate money to hire
additional employees, compensatory time off accrued faster than the
sheriff could allow it to be taken without endangering public safety.9 0
After expressing its concern as to whether breaches of public employ-
ment contracts should ever be considered deprivations of "property"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court assumed,
without deciding, that a property interest existed. 9 1 In proceeding to bal-
ance the Mathews factors, however, it concluded that there was no denial
of due process in the sheriff's failure to provide a hearing in advance of
his decision to disallow the compensatory time off.92 Initially the court
noted that the plaintiff's interest was tenuous, in that no decision was
made that the accrued compensatory leave would never be afforded-
merely that current conditions precluded allowing time off. Further, any
additional procedural safeguards would have been of little value to the
plaintiffs, because it was clear that the sheriff would have reached the
same conclusion, i.e., that he could not grant the leave without violating
his duty to maintain public safety.9 3 Finally, it would be a burden on
local officials if they had to grant a hearing every time they wanted to
change any contractual term of employment. 9 4
The Seventh Circuit relied heavily on the fact that a state court
hearing for breach of contract would have been available, and would in
fact have provided a more elaborate process than an administrative hear-
ing before the sheriff.9 5 However, the focus on this factor does not neces-
sarily mean that the court is applying Parratt to a situation where a pre-
88. Brown, 722 F.2d at 362-63 (7th Cir. 1983).
89. Id. at 362. Note several of the cited decisions are discussed in last year's Survey, supra note
3.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 363. Note though Posner's comment that in determining whether a particular breach
should be deemed a deprivation of property, "we must bear in mind that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not intended to shift the whole of the public law of the states into the federal courts." Id.
at 364.
92. Id. at 365.
93. Id. at 366.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 365.
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deprivation hearing would not be impractical. Rather the court arguably
rests its decision on a balancing of all three factors in Mathews. The
availability of a state remedy is relevant in determining the risk of errone-
ous deprivation and the added value of the procedural safeguards sought.
Due process requires only that some form of hearing be given prior to
final deprivation of a property interest.96 In this case, no final determina-
tion was ever made that appellants would not receive their accrued com-
pensatory leave. In fact, it was conceded that the personnel policy
granting such leaves was still in effect and that documentation of over-
time work continued.97 Thus, in a sense, it is simply a case where rights
are postponed, without any severe adverse impact on the parties, and
where any hearing would have been gratuitous.
A much more egregious set of circumstances was present in Altman
v. Hurst98 in which the court upheld dismissal of a civil rights action
brought by a police sergeant against his superior. Having been suspected
of encouraging another officer to appeal a suspension, plaintiff was reas-
signed to a fixed post outside the sheriff's window in front of the police
station. He was prohibited from leaving his post, even to go to the bath-
room, without first requesting permission; and he was denied indoor duty
even during inclement weather. Further, after initiating litigation, he
was reassigned to foot patrol duty, denied overtime opportunities, and
his vacation time was rescheduled. 99 The court found that state law did
not require a pre-deprivation hearing prior to the imposition of depart-
mental disciplinary sanctions, and that the only property interest created
was one in receiving vacation time in a particular month. This interest,
however, was considered trivial and insubstantial compared to the gov-
ernment's significant interest in managing the day-to-day work schedules
of its employees, so the court concluded that no deprivation of property
without due process had occurred.'0°
The court likened the fact situation to Parratt where plaintiff could
receive all the process he was due in a post-deprivation hearing-
"namely a state tort action for wrongful deprivation of his property."10'
While conceding that had the plaintiff quit his job, his constructive dis-
96. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977), noting that common law safeguards provided by the state significantly reduced the risk
of erroneous deprivaton.
97. Brown, 722 F.2d at 366. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972), stating that
even "a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
98. 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 385 (1984).
99. Id. at 1241.
100. Id. at 1242.
101. Id.
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charge would have enabled him to maintain this action, it concluded
nonetheless that permitting plaintiff to pursue this suit would "open the
federal flood gates to all manner of petty personnel disputes," which are
best left to the internal procedures established by employers. 0 2
The court's concern with opening federal floodgates to "petty" per-
sonnel disputes rings hollow in the context of this case where the harass-
ment reached a truly intolerable level. The indignities which plaintiff
was forced to suffer, coupled with a clear change in his employment sta-
tus, should have sufficed to create the type of liberty interest to which
procedural safeguards attach. The fact that state law did not create an
explicit right to a hearing prior to the imposition of departmental disci-
plinary actions should be immaterial, because federal law determines
whether or not a mutually explicit understanding has been created be-
tween the parties and whether minimum federal procedural requirements
are met. 10 3 In light of the clear mandate under state law that a hearing
be given prior to imposition of disciplinary punishment for removal, dis-
charge, or suspension, the police officer would arguably have thought
himself entitled to some type of a hearing prior to being subjected to this
type of disciplinary punishment.
The court further erred in its rejection of a substantive due process
claim. 10 4 The court conceded that plaintiff could not be disciplined in
retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment rights, but it concluded
that even if plaintiff was punished for encouraging another officer to ap-
peal her suspension, this was not the type of speech "of public concern"
which required much protection. 105 What the court ignores in this case
102. Id. at 1244.
103. Logan v. Zimmerman, supra note 96, states: "[B]ecause 'minimun [procedural] require-
ments [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have
specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse
official actions.' " Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division
v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). See also Vail, 706 F.2d at 1440; Winkler v. De Kalb, 648 F.2d 411,
414 (5th Cir. 1981); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 447-48 (2d Cir.
1980).
104. Another Seventh Circuit decision dealing with substantive due process claims is Phillips v.
Thompson, 715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983). Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), the court upheld the district court's determination that substantive
due process rights of mentally retarded adults were not violated because any constitutional right to
liberty of movement requires only reasonable regulation determined by professionals. Thus the min-
imum requirements imposed by Youngberg, i.e., that professional judgment be exercised in balancing
the liberty interest of mentally incapacitated persons against relevant state interest, was satisfied.
Further, due process simply requires that minimally adequate training as is reasonable in light of
plaintiff's freedom of movement be afforded, again with deference shown to the professional judg-
ment of those directing the operation of the institution. Thus the court affirmed the findings of the
district court that class members were receiving adequate training.
105. Altman, 734 F.2d at 1244. The court relied upon the recent Supreme Court decision in
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), holding that where an employee's speech only concerns
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as well as in Brown v. Brienen,10 6 is that due process also guarantees
fundamental fairness. 107 Earlier Seventh Circuit decisions acknowledge
that the due process clause embodies this assurance. For example, in
Ciechon v. City of Chicago, the city's discharge of an employee, following
an incomplete, biased investigation was held to violate plaintiff's due pro-
cess rights.10 8 The egregiousness of the sheriff's conduct in Altman war-
rants a finding that the plaintiff was similarly deprived of fundamental
fairness in violation of his right to due process of law. Although the
court's concern with federalizing employee grievances is understandable,
its denial of relief in this case is unfortunate. The court's statement that
''state court remedies provide sufficient relief for purposes of section
1983,"109 flies in the face of Monroe v. Pape,110 in which the Supreme
Court first established that a suit is actionable under § 1983 regardless of
what tort remedies the victim might have against the government under
state law in a state court.
B. Equal Protection Challenges to Government Regulation
Most of the equal protection challenges to government regulation
were rejected based on a finding that government was pursuing legitimate
legislative objectives.III The most interesting equal protection analysis is
matters of a personal interest, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision. This case, and related Seventh Circuit decisions, are discussed in
last year's Survey, supra note 3, at pp. 456-60.
106. In Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 366 (7th Cir. 1983), the court acknowledged plaintiff's
claim regarding due process "in its primary sense of fair procedure," but it never really analyzed it.
107. 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982). See also United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical
Center Commission, 689 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1982).
108. Altman, 734 F.2d at 1243.
109. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, the Court succinctly stated: "It is no answer that the
State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id. at
183. The Court's niggardly approach to due process in these cases should be contrasted with the
dicta in Schultz v. Baumgart, 738 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1984), involving the discharge of a Wisconsin
fire fighter. The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal, finding that it could not, as a
matter of law, hold that plaintiff was given adequate notice that he would be discharged. It added
that for purposes of remand, the lower court should take note that the availability of a post-depriva-
tion grievance procedure or a board hearing would not cure the constitutional wrong. In fact, the
court cited Vail, supra note 75, and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) for
the proposition that post-deprivation remedies do not satisfy due process if pre-deprivation remedies
are practicable. Id. at 237, n.9.
110. See, e.g., Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983) upholding Indi-
ana's ten-year statute of limitation for product liability suits as serving the legitimate legislative
purpose of lessening the risk of loss which manufacturers face when they place a product into the
stream of commerce. A similar challenge to the Indiana statute of limitations was rejected in Pitts v.
Unarco Industries, Inc., 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983).
111. 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1984).
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found in Sklar v. Byrne,' 1 2 raising the constitutionality of Chicago's
handgun ordinance. The Seventh Circuit ruled in 1982 that a town could
totally ban the use of hand guns without violating either federal or state
constitutional rights. 11 3 It was held in that case that the Second Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, protecting the rights to bear
arms, regulates only the federal government. 114 In this case rather than
flatly banning the possession of firearms, the city created an exception for
handguns validly registered to current owners in the City of Chicago
prior to the Act's effective date on April 10, 1982. Suit was brought by a
Skokie resident who moved to Chicago on April 15, 1982, just five days
after the Chicago ordinance took effect. He owned a handgun and pos-
sessed a valid Illinois firearms owner identification card. The ordinance
prevented him from keeping his gun because he was not a resident of the
City of Chicago on April 10, 1982. He thus argued that the ordinance
discriminated against new residents of Chicago who either owned or
wished to own handguns.
1 5
The court first wrestled with the question of the appropriate stan-
dard for review of the classification scheme. As the court noted, where a
legislative classification works to the disadvantage of a constitutionally
suspect class or impinged upon the exercise of a fundamental personal
right, the classification must meet an exacting "compelling interest" stan-
dard. However, in the absence of such concerns, a lesser standard is ap-
plied requiring only reasonableness. 1 6 The court first notes that the
handgun ordinance does not impinge upon any federal or state constitu-
tional right to bear arms, the latter being narrow and subject to extensive
regulation. 17 The more interesting question is whether the provision in-
terferes with the right to travel. The Supreme Court has recognized in
several cases that heightened scrutiny must be applied where the state
creates rights and limits their availability to individuals depending in part
upon the duration of their residence. 1 8 However, the court concludes
112. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
194 (1983).
113. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 269-71.
114. Sklar, 727 F.2d at 636.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 637. The court's conclusion that the Morton Grove ordinance did not violate the
Illinois constitution was reaffirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Kalodimos v. Village of Morton
Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 470 N.E.2d 266 (1984).
117. See cases cited 727 F.2d at 638. Such requirements are subject to heightened scrutiny be-
cause they are deemed to penalize exercise of the federally protected right to travel.
118. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). The Court in Zobel did not apply the stricter analy-
sis, but rather held that the means were not even rationally related to any goal. Thus Zobel is an
interesting example of stricter "traditional" equal protection analysis, even without a finding of a
suspect class or a fundamental right. See discussion in last year's Survey, supra note 3, at 494.
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that the classification in the Chicago ordinance is not a durational resi-
dence requirement, and that its effect on travel is only indirect. Unlike
the recently invalidated Alaskan dividend program which distributed
benefits based on length of residence in the state,' 19 here the ordinance
did not single out new residents of Chicago for discriminatory treatment.
It also affected current Chicago residents who do not own handguns,
those who own but have not registered their guns prior to the effective
date, and even those with registered handguns, who were prohibited from
replacing their guns.
1 2 0
Although the court's determination that strict scrutiny is not war-
ranted because the ordinance has only an "indirect effect" on freedom to
travel is troublesome, in that even indirect burdens on fundamental
rights should be impermissible, the key point here is that new residents
are not the only group singled out for disparate treatment. Thus the
need for active judicial intervention and strict scrutiny appears to be less
warranted. 121
The court properly characterizes the classification as imposing a
grandfather provision which favors established residents over newer
ones, the purpose being to protect reliance interests.1 22 Despite the
court's refusal to recognize any fundamental right or suspect classifica-
tion, it does note that "courts must certainly scrutinize grandfather
clauses to learn whether they are masks for exploitation or invidious dis-
crimination,"1 23 and it later notes that the rationality standard is not
"toothless". 124 The court procedes to conclude, however, that the ordi-
nance rationally furthers the purpose of protecting the reliance interests
of those who purchased handguns legally in Chicago before the effective
date of the ordinance. Numerous Supreme Court and lower federal
court decisions, cited by the Seventh Circuit, have recognized the legiti-
macy of reliance interests in an equal protection challenge to a grandfa-
ther clause.125 Although Chicago's ordinance could have protected the
119. Sklar, 727 F.2d at 638.
120. Id. at 639 n.8.
121. Id. at 639.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 640.
124. Id. at 642. See also Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984) upholding an exception to a
pension offset requirement whereby spousal benefits under the Social Security Act are reduced by the
amount of federal or state government pensions received by the applicant. The purpose of the excep-
tion was to protect spouses, largely women, who had come to rely upon a sexually discriminatory
program, subsequently invalidated by the Court. Even applying the heightened scrutiny used with
regard to gender-based classifications, the Court upheld the exception as being narrowly tailored to
protect individuals who made retirement plans prior to changes in the law.
125. Sklar, 727 F.2d at 642. Note the court relies upon the Supreme Court decision in City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), upholding a grandfather clause which protected estab-
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reliance interests of all those who had validly registered handguns on the
passage date, including non-residents, it cannot be said that the City of
Chicago built up any type of expectation in non-residents that upon mov-
ing to Chicago they could possess firearms. In essence the Chicago ordi-
nance provided that it would no longer permit registration of firearms in
its city in order to freeze the current supply of handguns in Chicago. As
the court concluded, "the fact that the ordinance stopped short of the
complete ban and protected those who relied on prior law does not vio-
late the equal protection clause."'
126
III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Employment discrimination cases were litigated under both Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964127 and the Civil Rights Act of
1866.128 In a case brought under the latter act, 129 Anooya v. Hilton Ho-
tels Corp.,13° the court addressed the question of whether a claim of dis-
crimination based solely on national origin states a cause of action under
Section 1981. The plaintiff alleged that he is "of Iraqi background" and
that he "was discriminated against on account of his national origin,
Iraq." 3' Relying on dicta in decisions by the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits, 13 2 the court summarily affirmed the dismissal stating that "[i]n the
absence of an allegation of racial animus, either explicit or reasonably
inferable from the pleadings, plaintiff cannot maintain his section 1981
action."' 133 In a concurring opinion, Judge Cudahy suggests the problem
may have been in the plaintiff's pleading. He indicates the purpose of
Section 1981 is to protect persons belonging to a group "distinct from
'white citizens' as a matter of race or color." 34 Indicating differences of
lished businesses by banning push cart vendors except for those who had been in business a certain
number of years. It was similarly reasoned in that case that only long established businesses who
relied on prior laws had the type of reliance interest which the city needed to protect. Although this
case is somewhat different in that it discriminates against non-residents who are unable to participate
in the political process, the group disadvantaged by the Chicago handgun ordinance also includes
Chicago residents. Thus the need for more active judicial intervention to protect those in "a position
of political powerlessness" is less apparent in this situation. See discussion at 727 F.2d at 639 n.8.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1982).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
128. The plaintiff also alleged a claim under Title VII but it was barred because the complaint
was not filed until 91 days after receipt of the Notice of Right to Sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)(1)
(1982). See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
129. 733 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1984).
130. Id. at 49.
131. Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 383-84 (2nd Cir. 1983); Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640
F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981).
132. 733 F.2d at 50.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 51.
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race and color are readily apparent, he would require allegations of fact
which at least raise an inference of some basis in race or color., 35 There-
fore, after this decision, plaintiffs stating a claim under Section 1981
should allege differences of race or color which distinguish them from
"white citizens." 136
Title VII plaintiffs frequently face dismissal of their cases for failure
to comply with rather strict time limits. Two cases this term addressed
the federal regulation which requires federal employees to bring com-
plaints to the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
counselor within thirty (30) days of "the matter causing [complainant] to
believe he had been discriminated against."' 37 The plaintiff in Wolfolk v.
Rivera' 38 claimed discrimination in hiring. Although he was hired in
September 1979, he did not learn until August 1980 that other employees
in the same office performing the same job, with qualifications inferior to
his, were receiving a higher salary. The question was whether his action
was barred by the failure to bring the matter to the attention of the EEO
counselor within thirty (30) days from the date of his hiring.
Because the plaintiff had no reason to suspect discrimination in hir-
ing until several months after the thirty (30) day limit had passed and
because he acted promptly in bringing the matter to the attention of the
EEO counselor after learning of the disparity in pay, the court concluded
he fit within the exception under the federal regulation. 13 9  "Circum-
stances beyond his control" prevented the plaintiff from bringing the
matter to the attention of his EEO counselor within thirty (30) days. In
reaching this conclusion the court adopted the Fifth Circuit standard:
A person is prevented by circumstances beyond his control from sub-
mitting a discrimination charge until the time when "facts that would
support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or
should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent re-
gard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff."' 40
135. See also, Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff's
allegation that he was of Mexican-American descent sufficient under § 1981); Gonzalez v. Stanford
Applied Engineering, Inc., 597 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (allegation of discrimination against
Mexican-Americans having a brown rather than a white skin sufficient under § 1981).
136. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i) (1982). 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4) (1982) provides for excep-
tions to the 30 day limit.
(4) The agency shall extend the limits in this section: (i) when the complainant shows
that he was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, or that he
was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from submitting the matter within the
time limits; or (ii) for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency.
137. 729 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 1117. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4)(i). See supra note 136.
139. 729 F.2d at 1117, quoting Reeb v. Economic Opportu.,ity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931
(5th Cir. 1975).
140. Id. In contrast, the plaintiff in Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1984), failed to
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This standard, the court indicated, strikes the appropriate balance be-
tween fairness to the complaining party and the importance of beginning
the administrative process in a timely manner. 141
While relying in party on private Title VII cases, the court was care-
ful to point out that it was not eliminating the differences between private
and federal employees who miss the filing deadlines under Title VII. The
equitable exceptions available to private employees under Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.,'142 can be more extensive than the exceptions avail-
able to federal employees who are limited by the federal regulation.
However, when an employee is claiming an exception based on lack of
knowledge of the facts supporting a discrimination charge, then the re-
sult should be the same whether proceeding under the regulation or
Zipes. 1
43
Difficult questions concerning compensatory seniority were before
the court in Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc. 144 In this class action the
court was required to apply the principles of two Supreme Court deci-
sions 145 to flight attendants who had been discharged pursuant to the
airline's "no marriage rule" and were eligible for reinstatement under the
terms of a settlement. The most difficult questions arose in the context of
"competitive seniority", i.e., that which can have an adverse effect on
other flight attendants not involved in the litigation. 146 Because of the
adverse impact on other fight attendants, the lower court had refused to
award the class members full, retroactive competitive seniority upon re-
hiring. The Seventh Circuit found this consistent with Franks v. Bow-
man Transportation Co. where the Court described the equitable powers
of the district courts as follows:
[D]istrict courts should take as their starting point the presumption in
favor of rightful-place seniority relief, and proceed with further legal
make the required showing of exceptional circumstances. Perhaps more importantly, the Sims court
noted that the equitable tolling principles announced in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385 (1982), should not be extended to cases involving federal defendants because of principles of
sovereign immunity. 725 F.2d at 1145. A waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.
141. 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
142. 729 F.2d at 1119.
143. 717 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1983).
144. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
145. Seniority is used by employers in a number of ways. It may determine both pay and bene-
fits, such as the number of vacation days and the number of passes. To the extent that an award of
retroactive seniority affects these aspects of employment, it represents a cost to the employer but it
has little of any direct impact on other flight attendants. However, because seniority is also utilized
to determine the relative rights of employees-choice of domicile, choice of flights, order of layoffs
etc.-an award of retroactive seniority has an obvious, direct impact on other attendants not directly
involved in the litigation. 717 F.2d at 1156-58.
146. 424 U.S. at 779 n.41.
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analysis from that point; and that such relief may not be denied on the
abstract basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees but
rather only on the basis of unusual adverse impact arising from facts
and circumstances that would not be generally found in Title VII
cases. 
147
Therefore, there was a need to engage in the delicate balance between the
statutory rights of the class members and the contractual rights of other
flight attendants.
The key then is to determine what constitutes "unusual adverse im-
pact." Here the court concluded it was appropriate to consider numer-
ous factors, not just whether other flight attendants would lose their jobs
as a result of a grant or an award of retroactive seniority. Based on its
interpretation of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
the court found that the relevant considerations "include the number of
victims, the number of non-victim employees affected, the alternatives
available to incumbents, and the economic circumstances of the indus-
try." 1 48 Relying quite heavily on the economic status of United Airlines
and the fact that it has a significant number of furloughed flight attend-
ants, the court applied the Teamsters factors and upheld the relief
awarded by the district judge. As to competitive seniority, class mem-
bers were credited with seniority based on the number of days they had
worked for United as flight attendants. For purposes of benefits repre-
senting a cost to the airline but not directly affecting incumbent flight
attendants, the district judge awarded class members seniority from the
day they were originally hired.
1 49
The seniority questions presented in Romasanta are very difficult
and not uncommon today because the economic condition of many in-
dustries has required a reduction in the number of employees. Obviously
it is more difficult to fashion meaningful retroactive seniority relief when
an employer is cutting back rather than expanding.1 50 Recognizing this,
the plaintiffs presented two alternative proposals to the district court, but
both were rejected. First, the class members suggested delaying their re-
instatement until openings occurred on the condition that all class mem-
bers be fully reinstated within two and one-half to three years. This was
rejected because the district court concluded that the impact on incum-
bent flight attendants would be only slightly less than if the class were
immediately reinstated.' 5' Another proposal was to give the class mem-
147. 717 F.2d at 1150, referring to Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 376 n.62.
148. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
149. 717 F.2d at 1159.
150. Id. at 1154.
151. Id. at 1156.
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bers "relative" seniority which would have placed them in the same rela-
tive position as when they were forced to leave United. While this would
mitigate the impact on incumbent flight attendants, the district court
found the impact on incumbents would still be substantial and therefore
rejected it. 152 The Seventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the
lower court in rejecting the class members' proposals.
A claim of racial discrimination in the denial of tenure required the
court to balance the qualified academic privilege with the need of the
Equal Employmetn Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to obtain full dis-
closure of information in order to investigate a charge. When the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame refused to comply with an administrative
subpoena duces tecum requiring the university to provide "copies of the
complete personnel records of [the] charging party . . . and all other
teaching personnel in the Economics Department for the period January
1, 1980 to the present," the EEOC applied to the district court for an
order to show cause why its subpoena should not be enforced. 53 While
limiting the scope of the subpoena to the files of those faculty members
granted tenure prior to the charging party's eligibility for tenure, the
court refused to allow the university to delete the names and identities of
faculty members participating in the peer review process and refused the
university's request for a non-disclosure agreement from the charging
party before the EEOC could release the information to him.
Referring to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence' 54 and the
Supreme Court interpretation which allows courts "the flexibility to de-
velop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis. . . and to leave the door
open to change,"' 55 the court recognized "a qualified academic freedom
privilege protecting academic institutions against the disclosure of the
names and identities of persons participating in the peer review process
.... ,"56 After concluding that the district court erred in refusing to
recognize a qualified privilege, the court addressed the scope of the privi-
lege in this case.
The Seventh Circuit outlined in some detail the process to be fol-
lowed by the district court. first, the university should be permitted to
redact identifying information from the personnel files and then present
both the redacted files and the original files to the district court for in
152. EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 1983).
153. FED. R. EvID. 501.
154. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980), quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 40891 (1974).
155. 715 F.2d at 337. See also, Gray v. Bd. of Higher Education, City of N.Y., 692 F.2d 901
(2nd Cir. 1982); but see, In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981).
156. 715 F.2d at 338.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
camera review by the court. If the court determines that the redactions
are reasonably necessary to preserve the identity of the evaluating faculty
members, then the redacted files should be turned over to the EEOC.
Second, if the EEOC believes it needs additional information, it would be
given an opportunity to make a "substantial showing of 'particularized
need' for relevant information, a burden similar to that imposed on a
party seeking disclosure of grand jury materials."'' 57 In discussing "par-
ticularized need" the court anticipated that disclosure of the identities of
the evaluating faculty members would be required only under limited
circumstances. By imposing a strict burden on the EEOC, the court re-
flected its reluctance to become involved in the review of tenure
decisions.1
5 8
Finally, concerning the university's request for a non-disclosure
agreement, the court required the issuance of a protective order to assure
that the "privileged materials are not disclosed to persons not directly
involved in this action up to and including the time any private action is
filed by the charging party."' 59 Thus the court guarded against disclo-
sure of even the redacted files on the grounds that they are still highly
confidential and pertain to a relatively small number of faculty members.
The court saw the restrictions and limitations it imposed on the EEOC's
access to the university's records as necessary to preserve the integrity of
the university peer review process as well as other confidential relation-
ships. Thus, while the EEOC subpoena would still be enforced, the uni-
versity basically prevailed in its objections to the subpoena as issued by
the EEOC.' 6°
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Relationship Between Section 1983 and Other Federal Statutes
Difficult questions concerning the availability of Section 1983161 to
157. Id. at 339.
158. Id. at 340.
159. In another case involving the enforcement of an EEOC subpoena, EEOC v. A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 711 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1983), the court upheld the district court's enforcement of an
EEOC subpoena over several objections by the employer. The case did not involve a privilege;
rather the employer argued that the agency did not have "reasonable cause to believe that a violation
of the act had occurred." Id. at 784. Relying in part on EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055 (6th
Cir. 1982), the court gave a broad interpretation to the investigative powers of the EEOC, pointing
out that the purpose of the subpoena is to help determine whether probable cause exists. While
fishing expeditions are not sanctioned, the EEOC certainly does not have to state facts sufficient to
make out a prima facie case. Id. at 786.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
161. These difficult questions result from three recent Supreme Court decisions: Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981);
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). For back-
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enforce federal statutory rights continue to arise. 162 This issue was con-
sidered by the court in three cases.1 63 In Huebschen v. Dept. of Health
and Social Services,164 the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment by his su-
pervisor in the course of his employment. He brought an action under
both Section 1983 and Title VII; the defendants included his supervisor
who is not an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII. Therefore,
the plaintiff attempted to enforce Title VII rights against his supervisor
through Section 1983. Without addressing the question whether Title
VII provides the exclusive remedy for the employment discrimination
alleged in this case, the Seventh Circuit decided that "a plaintiff cannot
bring an action under Section 1983 based upon Title VII against a person
who could not be sued directly under Title VII. '165 This ruling seems to
simply confirm that Section 1983 provides only a cause of action, not
substantive rights.
A more difficult question was raised in the second case. The plaintiff
in Polchowski v. Gorris166 claimed that a local police department had vio-
lated the Justice System Improvement Act1 67 by disclosing certain statis-
tical and criminal history information during a political campaign. A
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Section 1983 was
granted by the lower court. After examining the federal statute, the
court concluded that the plaintiff, although he has a right to be free from
unwarranted disclosures of statistical information, could not use Section
1983 as a remedy because Congress provided comprehensive private rem-
edies but limited them to unwarranted disclosures by agencies of the U.S.
government. 168 Because the remedies provided by Congress were limited
to action by federal agencies, the court found an intent to preclude pri-
vate enforcement against state or local officials through Section 1983.
ground in this circuit, see Bodensteiner and Levinson, Civil Liberties: Current Developments in the
Seventh Circuit Regarding First Amendment, Procedural Due Process, Employment Discrimination
and the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 59 CHi. KENT L. REV. 403, 444-54 (1983).
162. In another case, Cannon v. Univ. of Health Sciences/Chicago Medical School, 710 F.2d
351 (7th Cir. 1983), the plaintiff did not attempt to enforce a federal statute through § 1983, but the
relationship between constitutional claims under § 1983 and a statutory claim under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, was discussed in the context of determining
whether the § 1983 claim was barred by laches. This case includes a fairly lengthy discussion of the
application of laches to § 1983 actions. Id. at 357-63.
163. 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983).
164. Id. at 1170. Compare Day v. Wayne Cty Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1202-05 (6th Cir.
1984) (white public employees can sue under both Title VII and § 1983 when claiming a constitu-
tional violation as well as a violation of Title VII, a claim of retaliation does not form basis for a
§ 1983 claim).
165. 714 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1983).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 37 89g (1982).
167. 714 F.2d at 752. See Privacy Act 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
168. Id. at 751.
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This conclusion was supported by the fact that the first bill introduced in
Congress contained a remedy for improper disclosures by local authori-
ties, but it was deleted.
One of the key questions in this area is whether a plaintiff must
demonstrate that Congress intended to create a right which could be pri-
vately enforced or whether the defendant must show that Congress in-
tended to foreclose private enforcement of a federal statute through
Section 1983. In Polchowski, the court concluded that Congress intended
to foreclose such enforcement. However, in its preliminary discussion of
the issue the court suggested that "the inquiry resembles the analysis
used to determine whether a private cause of action may be implied from
an enactment of Congress."' 169 Under this analysis, the court noted that
46a party must demonstrate that Congress intended to create a right
which may be privately enforced."' 70 Immediately following this, the
court indicated that "a party may proceed under Sec. 1983 to remedy a
violation of a federal statutory right unless Congress intended to fore-
close private enforcement of the statute or unless the statute does not
create an enforceable 'right' under Sec. 1983."''71 Because congressional
intent is frequently not clear, this difference can be significant and Sec-
tion 1983 should be eliminated only in situations where there is a clear
indication of a "congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits
under Section 1983."172
The final case involves the role of Section 1983 in enforcing the edu-
cational rights of handicapped children. The plaintiff in Doe v. Koger
173
was expelled from school in accordance with regular disciplinary proce-
dures rather than the change in placement procedures required by the
Education of All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA). 74 The lower
court held that handicapped children can be expelled, but not without a
determination of whether the child's handicap is the cause of the disrup-
tive behavior in accordance with EAHCA procedures. 75 After the
lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff under the EAHCA, the parties
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra, 453 U.S. at 20; see also Bodensteiner and Levinson, Civil
Liberties. Adherence to Established Principles, 58 CHi. KENT L. REV. 269, 328-30 (1982).
172. 710 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1983).
173. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, et seq. (1982).
174. Another case raising issues under the EAHCA, Timms v. Metropolitan School Dist. of
Wabash County, Ind., 722 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1983), was dismissed for failure to exhaust the admin-
istrative remedies required under the Act. Claims under § 504 of The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1976), were also dismissed for failure to exhaust the EAHCA mandated administrative
remedies.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
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agreed to the actual relief and reserved the question of attorney fees for
later submission to the court. The issue on appeal was whether the plain-
tiff could recover fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act
of 1976176 under the theory that the EAHCA had been enforced through
Section 1983.
While recognizing that the Seventh Circuit had generally precluded
the use of Section 1983 to enforce the EAHCA, 177 the plaintiff in Koger
argued that her case was different because she was attacking the defend-
ants' refusal to utilize the administrative procedures mandated by the
EAHCA. Therefore, the plaintiff argued that Section 1983 should be
available at least in an action to require a state to comply with the proce-
dural mandates of the EAHCA. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, holding that handicapped children can bring actions under the
jurisdictional provision of the EAHCA 78 even when they are suing to
bring deficient state procedures into conformity with the EAHCA.
179
Once the court concluded that the relief obtained by the plaintiff was
available in an action under Section 1415(e) of the EAHCA, it then re-
lied upon Anderson in deciding that "section 1983 was superfluous to
plaintiff's relief' 80 and thus could not be utilized for attorney fees under
Section 1988.181
The decision in Koger is consistent with a later Supreme Court deci-
sion in Smith v. Robinson,182 in which the Court concluded that
[w]here the EHA is available to a handicapped child asserting a right
to a free appropriate public education, based either on the EHA or on
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the EHA
is the exclusive avenue through which the child and his parents or
guardian can pursue their claim.
183
Because Section 1983 is a statutory remedy, "Congress retains the au-
thority to repeal it or replace it with an alternative remedy,"' 8 4 and the
176. Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e).
178. 710 F.2d at 1213. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon Bd. of Educ. of the
Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), which emphasizes that a
court's inquiry and actions under the EAHCA should be to assure that the state has adopted the
policies and procedural assurances required by the Act.
179. 710 F.2d at 1213.
180. Id.
181. 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984).
182. Id. at 3470. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether Congress intended to pre-
clude resort to § 1983 on a due process challenge. Id at 3470. It is suggested that such a claim
under § 1983 right not be inconsistent with the EAHCA because suits to force schools to provide the
process due under both the Constitution and the Act are different than utilizing the procedures
mandated by the Act to obtain substantive educational rights. Id. at 3470-71 n.17.
183. Id. at 3469.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
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Court found that in passing the EAHCA, Congress did intend to make it
the exclusive avenue for enforcing fourteenth amendment claims virtu-
ally identical to claims under the Act. The Court also held that Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act1 85 cannot be used as a source of attorney
fees 18 6 "[w]here Section 504 adds nothing to the substantive rights of a
handicapped child."
' 1 87
This case is particularly troublesome because there was no express
indication that Congress intended to replace Section 1983 actions to en-
force the fourteenth amendment with statutory rights and remedies
under the EAHCA. To the contrary, the history of the Act indicates
that Congress wanted to assure compliance with cases establishing the
rights of handicapped children to an equal educational opportunity
under the fourteenth amendment by making funds available to the
States.188 While the EAHCA does generally provide rights as extensive
as those under the fourteenth amendment, it is more limited in its reme-
185. Plaintiffs prevailing under § 504 are entitled to attorney fees under 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982).
186. 104 S. Ct. at 3474.
187. Congress' recognition of the presumed enforceability of the constitutional rights of handi-
capped children appears throughout the legislative history accompanying the EAHCA. At the out-
set, Congress recognized that its consideration of the EAHCA "followed a series of landmark court
cases establishing in law the right to education for all handicapped children." S. Rep. No. 168, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1975). Two of the landmark cases, Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of the District of Colum-
bia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), both of which established that the exclusion of handicapped
children from a free public education violates equal protection and due process, were repeatedly
cited by Congress. See S. Rep No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 22-23 (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 332,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1975); see generally Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School
Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 n.2, 192-200 (1982).
Based on Congress' belief that these landmark "court orders must be implemented," S. Rep.
No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1975), Congress enacted the EAHCA "to provide assistance to
States in carrying out their responsibilities under State law and the Constitution of the United States,
"id. at 13 (emphasis added); see also 121 Cong, Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at
19504 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Congress in fact could not have been more explicit in its intent
that the new EAHCA funding, as well as other federal funding, be utilized by "States to assist them
in carrying our their responsibilities under State laws, State Constitutions, and U.S. Constitution," S.
Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1975) (emphasis added).
By providing judicial review to insure that participating states were complying with the restric-
tions which accompanied the use of EAHCA funding, see Board ofEduc. of Hendrick Hudson Cen-
tral School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204-08 (1982), Congress did not eliminate wholesale the
enforcement of the state and other federal statutory rights of handicapped children, much less en-
forcement of their federal constitutional rights through § 1983. Congress quite specifically recog-
nized that it was "discriminatory treatment and exclusion which Court cases [and] State and Federal
laws are designed to remedy." S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1975). And, lest there
be any doubt, Congress specifically stated that it did "not intend" EAHCA emforcement "to limit
the rights of individuals to seek redress of grievances through other avenues such as bringing civil
action[s] in Federal or State courts to protect and enforce the rights of handicapped children under
applicable law." Id. at 26.
188. See Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
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dies in that it does not expressly provide for compensatory damages' 8 9 or
attorney fees. ' 90
B. Application of Preclusion Principles to Civil Rights Actions
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that the
usual rules of preclusion apply in Section 1983 actions. Pursuant to stat-
ute, 19 federal courts are required to give preclusive effect to state court
judgments whenever the courts of the state issuing the judgments would
do so. In Allen v. McCurry 92 the Court decided that Section 1983 does
not create an exception to Section 1738. Therefore, a federal court plain-
tiff seeking damages for violations of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments in a Section 1983 action may be precluded by a state court denial
of his motion to suppress evidence based on the same grounds. Because
the federal court plaintiff in Allen v. McCurry, as a defendant in the state
criminal proceeding, had questioned the constitutionality of the search
and seizure by moving to suppress the evidence, the constitutional issue
raised by the plaintiff in federal court had already been decided adverse
to him. Section 1983 does not guarantee plaintiffs a right to a federal
court determination of their constitutional issues. ' 93 More generally, this
case means that a plaintiff who raises and obtains a state court determi-
nation of a federal issue cannot get another determination of the same
issue in a subsequent Section 1983 action in federal court.
In a later case, the Court further extended the application of preclu-
sion principles of Section 1983 actions. The plaintiff, in Migra v. Warren
City School District Board of Education, ' 94 brought an action challenging
the decision of the Board of Education not to renew her employment as a
supervisor of elementary education. She first challenged the Board's de-
cision in state court arguing breach of contract and wrongful interference
189. See Bodensteiner, Availability of Attorney Fees in Suits to Enforce the Educational Rights of
Children with Handicaps, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 391 (1983).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
191. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
192. Id. at 103. See also Haring v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983), in which the Court held that
a federal court § 1983 plaintiff, who pleaded guilty to a state court criminal charge, is not precluded
from litigating the validity of the search conducted by police officials. Issue preclusion is not appli-
cable because the state law requirements for this doctrine are not met by a guilty plea. The Court
refused to adopt a common law form of claim preclusion based on the argument that the federal
court plaintiff could have litigated the legality of the search in the context of the criminal proceeding.
A plea of guilty does not constitute either an admission that the search was valid or a waiver of any
civil claim under the fourth amendment. Adoption of such a rule of preclusion "would threaten"
important interests in preserving federal courts as an available forum for the vindication of constitu-
tional rights. Id. at 2378.
193. 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
194. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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with an employment contract. The state court awarded her reinstate-
ment and compensatory damages.
Subsequently Dr. Migra filed an action in federal court challenging
the Board's actions under Section 1983 and raising claims under the first,
fifth and fourteenth amendments. She sought compensatory and punitive
damages as well as injunctive relief. Summary judgment was granted to
the defendants on the basis of res judicata and the complaint was dis-
missed. Relying on Allen v. McCurry,195 the Court concluded that Sec-
tion 1738 requires a federal court in a Section 1983 action to preclude
litigation of issues which could have been raised in the earlier state pro-
ceeding, if they would be precluded in a second state court case. In other
words, Section 1738 applies not only to Section 1983 actions which at-
tempt to relitigate issues previously decided in state court, but also to
federal court actions under Section 1983 which attempt to raise issues
which could have been litigated in a prior state court proceeding.
1 96
The scope of Section 1738 was again examined in McDonald v. City
of West Branch, Mich. ,197 in which the Court held'that Section 1738 does
not apply to arbitration decisions since arbitration is not a "judicial pro-
ceeding." Having concluded that Section 1738 does not require giving
preclusive effect to an arbitration award, the Court refused to fashion a
judicial rule requiring preclusion in this situation. The Court relied on
four considerations in reaching this conclusion: first, arbitrators may not
have the expertise to resolve the complex legal issues which arise in Sec-
tion 1983 actions; second, arbitrators may not have the authority to en-
force Section 1983; third, unions may not always present employees'
grievances vigorously in arbitration proceedings because their interests
may not be the same; and fourth, fact finding in arbitration proceedings
is not generally equivalent to judicial fact finding in that the rules of
evidence, discovery rules and cross examination are generally not
available. 198
These principles, particularly those enunciated in Migra, were ap-
plied this term by the Seventh Circuit. In Hagee v. City of Evanston, 99
developers challenged the city's revocation of a building permit in a state
195. The case was remanded to give the district court an opportunity to determine whether the
second action would have been barred under Ohio law. 104 S. Ct. at 899. In another case, Marrese
v. Amer. Acad. Ortho. Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1151-56 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3553
(1984), the court held that a state court action barred a subsequent federal antitrust case even though
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims.
196. 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
197. Id. at 1803-04.
198. 729 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1984).
199. The court emphasized that the federal court cannot give a state court judgment greater
preclusive effect than it would have in a subsequent state court action. Id. at 512.
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court and obtained injunctive relief. After the construction project was
completed, the developers sued the city in federal court under Section
1983 seeking damages for violation of their rights under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Noting that under Migra the state court judg-
ment is entitled to the same preclusive effect, 2°° it would have in the
courts of Illinois, the court examined Illinois preclusion law and con-
cluded that the federal action was barred.
C Qualified Immunity
The court was required to apply immunity doctrines set forth in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,20 1 in the context of procedural due process and first
amendment claims.20 2 In Benson v. Scott,20 3 the plaintiff claimed the Illi-
nois Attorney General violated his rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments in determining that Benson was not entitled to representa-
tion by the state in a civil suit against Benson arising out of his duties as a
state employee. Because the exact requirements of procedural due pro-
cess vary from situation to situation and are not precisely defined, it is
not easy to determine whether a state official violated clearly established
procedures of which a reasonable person should have been aware. While
recognizing that the requirements of due process have been settled for a
number of situations, the court concluded that "it is not clear even today
that the Constitution required [the attorney general to use more elabo-




Therefore, the attorney general was entitled to a qualified immunity.
The plaintiff also alleged that the decision to deny representation
was in retaliation for the exercise of first amendment rights. Here the
court indicated that the "right of employees to be free from retaliation
for their exercise of First Amendment rights has been clear since at least
1968."205 Therefore, the attorney general was not entitled to a qualified
immunity on the first amendment claim. The court pointed out that the
plaintiff would still have to prove the allegations of his complaint in or-
der to prevail on the first amendment claim. In other words, denying a
200. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See generally Survey, supra note 3, at 533-38.
201. In two other cases the court decided that a prison institutional disciplinary committee is
entitled to only a qualified immunity rather than an absolute immunity as a quasi judicial body. See
Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 1984); Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1117 (7th
Cir. 1983).
202. 734 F.2d 1181 (7th Cir. 1984).
203. Id. at 1185.
204. See, Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Id. at 1185. Whether the law is clearly
established should be determined by the court rather than the jury. McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d
1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1984).
205. 734 F.2d at 1186.
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qualified immunity does not establish liability. 206
D. Damages
In the review of the Seventh Circuit decisions last term it was
pointed out that the court had not resolved the dispute over the applica-
tion of Carey v. Piphus20 7 to cases alleging violation of substantive consti-
tutional rights, such as the first amendment. 20 8 This term, in Crawford v.
Garnier,20 9 a case finding a violation of first amendment rights, the court
upheld an award of compensatory damages for loss of wages, loss of
fringe benefits, out-of-pocket costs, injury to reputation, and pain and
suffering, but reduced an award of $10,000 for injury to civil rights to
$1.00. The court based its holding on the earlier decision in Kincaid v.
Rusk.210 Therefore, despite earlier confusion, the court now seems to be
favoring a strict application of Carey v. Piphus to first amendment claims
with damages limited to compensation for actual injury.
The standard for awarding punitive damages in Section 1983 cases
was discussed in several decisions. Basically, the Seventh Circuit applied
the recent decision in Smith v. Wade, 21 in which the Court held that
punitive damages may be awarded when the defendant's conduct is
shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reck-
less or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. 21 2
Under Smith punitive damages can be awarded for the purpose of deter-
ring or punishing constitutional violations, 21 3 and the Court rejected the
notion that "the deterrent and punitive purposes of punitive damages are
served only if the threshold for punitive damages is higher in every case
than the underlying standard for liability in the first instance. ' 21 4 There-
fore, where the standard for liability requires a showing of reckless disre-
gard or intent, a finding of liability may entitle a plaintiff to punitive
damages.
Applying Smith v. Wade, the court approved an award of punitive
damages in Merritt v. De Los Santos 215 based on a finding that the de-
206. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
207. See Survey, supra note 3, at 540-42.
208. 719 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1983).
209. 670 F.2d 737, 745-46 (7th Cir. 1982).
210. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
211. Id. at 56. Earlier the Seventh Circuit had required a "showing of aggravating circum-
stances or malicious intent." Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208, 1217 (7th Cir. 1980).
212. 461 U.S. at 54.
213. Id. at 51.
214. 721 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1983).
215. 719 F.2d 1317, 1325 (7th Cir. 1983). See also McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1326
(7th Cir. 1984), where the court approved a jury instruction indicating punitive damages were avail-
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fendant had willfully and knowingly violated the plaintiff's right to an
impartial tribunal. Similarly, in Crawford v. Gamier,21 6 a finding that the
defendant had acted "maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively in terminat-
ing the plaintiff's employment" supported an award of punitive damages.
this expanded availability of punitive damages can obviously be impor-
tant in Section 1983 cases, particularly in light of the application of Ca-
rey v. Piphus to violations of substantive constitutional rights such as
those protected by the first amendment.
E. Attorney Fees
The court faced questions of first impression concerning the applica-
tion of a Rule 68217 offer of judgment which includes the plaintiff's attor-
ney fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.218
The defendants in Chesny v. Marek2 19 made a timely Rule 68 offer "for a
sum, including costs now accrued and attorney's fees, of [$100,000]."
The court first decided that the form of offer made by the defendants is
valid under the Rule. In reaching this conclusion the court recognized
that it might, in some cases, add to the burden of district judges in that
they may have to determine how much of the fee accrued before the date
of the judgment offer and whether the offer was actually more favorable
than the judgment received by the plaintiff. Assuming plaintiff's counsel
keep detailed records of when hours were incurred, such apportionment
should not be overly difficult. 220 The court also rejected the suggestion
that Rule 68 offers including attorney fees would cause a serious conflict
of interest for the plaintiff's attorney. Here the court indicated that the
potential conflict is no greater than in any case involving a contingent fee




The second question is whether the rejection of a valid Rule 68 offer,
which is more favorable than the judgment ultimately obtained by the
plaintiff, precludes the plaintiff from obtaining an award of fees for work
done after the offer was made. This issue requires an interpretation of
able where the act or omission of the defendant was maliciously or wantonly or oppressively done.
The court went on to define each of these terms. Id. at 1326 n.2. The court did find that the jury
award of $15,000 was excessive and directed the lower court to reduce it to around $6,000. Id. at
1327.
216. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
217. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
218. 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2149 (1984).
219. Id. at 476-77.
220. Id. at 477-78.
221. Id. at 479.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
the sanction in the Rule which provides that if the offer is rejected and
"the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than
the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the
offer." More specifically, does "cost" in this context include attorney
fees? Here the court concluded that "cost" did not include attorney fees
available under Section 1988 because to do so would conflict with the
policy behind Section 1988 which was intended to encourage meritorious
civil rights actions. Attorneys "should not be deterred from bringing
good faith actions to vindicate fundamental rights by the prospect of sac-
rificing all claims to attorney's fees for legal work at trial if they win,
merely because on the eve of trial they turn down what turned out to be a
more favorable settlement offer."' 222 Characterizing the right to fees
under Section 1988 as "substantive" for purposes of deciding the issue
before it, the court indicated that any other interpretation of Rule 68 in
this case might question its validity under the Rules Enabling Act 223 be-
cause it would infringe upon the substantive policy reflected in Section
1988.
Two cases deal with the application of the recent decision in Hensley
v. Eckerhart 224 in which the Supreme Court established the standard for
setting a fee award under Section 1988 where a plaintiff has achieved
only limited success in the litigation. The plaintiffs in Mary Beth G. v.
City of Chicago225 sued the city and several police officers challenging the
city's policy which required a strip search and visual inspection of the
body cavities of all women arrested and detained in the city lock-ups.
Claims against two arresting officers for false arrest and excessive force
were unsuccessful. The plaintiffs were successful in their challenge to the
strip search policy but only as to the city and not individual defendants.
In applying Hensley to this situation, the court stated:
The case instructs, however, that the starting point for separating
an unrelated, unsuccessful claim from a related, unsuccessful claim is
to determine whether a particular unsuccessful claim shares a "com-
mon core of facts" with the successful claim or is based on a "related
legal theory." We believe a useful tool for making this determination
is to focus on whether the claims seek relief for essentially the same
course of conduct. Under this analysis, an unsuccessful claim will be
unrelated to a successful claim when the relief sought on the unsuc-
cessful claim is intended to remedy a course of conduct entirely dis-
tinct and separate from the course of conduct that gave rise to the
222. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
223. 461 U.S. 424 (1983). See Survey, supra note 3, at 513-15.
224. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
225. Id. at 1279 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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injury on which the relief granted is premised. 226
Applying this, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
fees for the two unsuccessful claims relating to the arrest because they
related to conduct "distinctly different ' 227 from the conduct relating to
the strip search claim. However, the court concluded that the district
court erred in excluding the time spent litigating the strip search claim
against the individual defendants. The court stated that an "award of
attorney's fees for time expended in remedying illegal conduct should not
turn on whether only some or all of the defendants named in connection
with the conduct are ultimately held liable. ' 228 The key here was the
fact that the plaintiffs had obtained all relief sought under this claim,
even though they did not recover from all defendants. Because the indi-
vidual defendants were not named frivolously, the city was found liable
for all time expended litigating the strip search claim.
Another case, Illinois Welfare Rights Organization v. Miller,2 29 re-
quired application of Hensley principles in a case which was settled after
extensive litigation resulted in partial summary judgment for the plain-
tiffs. First, the Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court determina-
tion that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties because the law suit was a
"catalyst" in bringing about a legislative change. 230  The court then
noted the problem in applying Hensley because it involved fully litigated
claims rather than a settlement. Therefore, the court focused on the sec-
ond aspect of the analysis required by Hensley, "i.e. whether the amount
of the award is reasonable in light of the extent of plaintiffs' overall suc-
cess."12 31 This requires a factual inquiry and the court directed the dis-
trict court on remand to compare the results obtained from the litigation
with the plaintiffs' ultimate goals or motives in bringing the litigation.
By comparing the relief obtained to the plaintiffs' objective as indicated
in the pleadings, the court can determine the extent of the plaintiffs' suc-
cess and award fees accordingly.
232
While not discussed in the two cases referred to above, another
Supreme Court decision, Blum v. Stenson,2 33 is important in determining
the amount of fees to be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff under Section
1988. Blum is significant for two reasons. First, it held that fees must be
226. Id. at 1280.
227. Id.
228. 723 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1983).
229. Id. at 568-69.
230. Id. at 568.
231. Id. at 569.
232. 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
233. Id. at 1545-47.
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calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant com-
munity rather than on the basis of the cost of providing legal services.
Therefore, fees should not be reduced because the prevailing plaintiff was
presented by a non-profit legal aid organization. 234 Second, the Court
considered the appropriateness of an upward adjustment or application
of a multiplier to the base rate. While not precluding such upward ad-
justments under Section 1988, the Court overturned a fifty percent (50%)
upward adjustment which the district court based on "the complexity of
the litigation, the novelty of the issues, the high quality of representation,
the 'great benefit' to the class, and the 'riskiness' of the law suit."' 235 Be-
cause all of these factors are taken into account in calculating a reason-
able, fully compensatory fee, they should not serve as the basis for an
upward adjustment.
Certainly it appears that multipliers or upward adjustments will be
more difficult to obtain after the decision in Blum. Such adjustments
would seem to be most likely where the attorneys have a contingent fee
arrangement with the risk of receiving no fee if their clients do not pre-
vail. 236 However, the risks associated with the litigation and the reason
why they support an upward adjustment should be in the record.
234. Id. at 1548-50. Regarding risk, it should be noted that the Court did not preclude "the risk
of not being the prevailing party in a § 1983 case and therefore not being entitled to an award of
attorney's fees from one's adversary." as a justification for an upward fee adjustment. Id. at 1550
n. 17. Here the record simply did not justify such an adjustment based on risk.
235. Id. at 1550 n.17; see also, 104 S. Ct. at 1550-51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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